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ARTICLE ESSAY
RESPECT FOR DIVERSITY: THE CASE OF
FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT
Carl Tobias*

Respect for diversity was one quality many faculty members considered significant when searching in 1987 for a new dean of the
University of Michigan School of Law.I Yet other so-called elite law
schools and less prestigious institutions recently have evinced little
concern for diversity and even indifference toward the idea. Tenure
and appointment disputes at several Ivy League schools have
sparked heated controversy and call into question their institutional
commitments to diversity. Those disputes have involved the legitimacy of work by women in legal theory and feminist legal thought,
although considerable contentious activity also seems to reflect a
general lack of respect for diversity. The controversies now appear
to be increasing in number and intensity, while they particularly
threaten what progress has been made in securing women's full participation in the legal academy. It is important, therefore, to discuss
the disputes candidly and to search for solutions to the problems
raised. 2
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Marina Angel, Bari Burke,
Jay Feinman, Marc Feldman, Tom Huff, Michael Libonati, Bill Luneburg, John Orth,
Michael Risinger, Peggy Sanner, and Marianne Smythe for, valuable suggestions, to the
Harris Trust and the Cowley Endowment for generous, continuing support, and to
Brenda Smith for typing this piece. Errors that remain are mine alone.
I. "Finding" a New Dean, 32 LAw QUADRANGLE NOTES, No. I at 2 (1987). Respect
for diversity has not always been voiced at Michigan, and the strength of that
institution's actual commitment to diversity remains unclear. Indeed, a survey compiled
in the 1986-87 academic year showed that of thirty-nine tenured positions at Michigan,
one was held by a woman. Moss, Would This Happen to a Man?, A.B.A. J., June 1988, at
50, 53. For that survey which includes much valuable data on tenure decisions affecting
women and minorities, see Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988). Michigan, however,recently
offered a tenured professorship to Catherine MacKinnon. Lewin, job Offer to Feminist
Scholar l\Iay Mark Tum, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1989, at B5, col. 3.
2. For a recent study of women and tenure in law schools, that draws upon
literature which relates in numerous ways to the issues addressed in this piece, see
Angel, Women in Legal Education: Whal It's Like To Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the
Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 799 ( 1988). When that literature is
particularly applicable, reference will be made to it, although extensive citation is not
warranted in the essay format employed. For a recent collection of numerous articles
which treat many issues relating to women and legal education and that clearly illustrate
the value of having diverse perspectives on scholarship and teaching, see Women in Legal
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For some time, it has been recognized that law school faculty have
diverse and potentially conflicting responsibilities. 3 They teach in
institutions which are neither completely within nor totally outside
the mission and spirit of the university as a whole. Legal academicians are expected to pursue ostensibly intellectual, theoretical endeavors, especially in their scholarship. Faculty members are
required to do so, even as they must inculcate professional norms
and impart technical skills in students as preparation for practice in
a profession which numerous academicians disdain, others have rejected, and some have never experienced.
The law itself has become more difficult to comprehend. For instance, it is decreasingly clear that law is a discipline distinct from
other areas of inquiry, that law and politics are separate phenomena,
that the substance of law can be divorced from its procedural aspects, or that "contracts" and "torts" denominate discrete fields. 4
Gone are the halcyon days when, for example, widespread agreement existed that law was a discipline with fixed, ascertainable
boundaries or that law could be neatly compartmentalized into
clearly definable substantive areas.
Indeed, the present seems to be a period of much more uncertainty and indeterminacy than formerly; the very question of what
law is, is being vigorously debated. 5 The phenomena mentioned
above may only be temporary, although they have been apparent for
a number of years. The solutions which were adequate in an earlier
age no longer will suffice; with the expansion of knowledge, consensus may well become more difficult to achieve. In short, legal academicians are uncertain about precisely what it means to teach, write
about, and practice law and what law is and should be in a complex,
Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, 1-193 (1988). Cf
Zenoff and Lorio, What Jl'e Know, What We Think Jl'e Know, and What We Don't Know About
Women Law Professors, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 869 ( 1983) (earlier study of women faculty in law
schools).
3. For a cogent exposition of the ideas in this paragraph, see Bergin, The Law
Teacher: A /I-Ian Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637 (1968).
4. The Law and Society Association and its journal, LAW AND SocIETY REVIEW,
illustrate the first point. The inseparability of law and politics is a central tenet of critical
legal studies. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQ.UE (D. Kairys ed.
1982). For recent treatment of substance and procedure, see Burbank, The Costs of
Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987). One classic on contracts and
torts is G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT ( 1974). For a recent analysis, see
Feinman, The jurisprudence of Doctrinal Classification: Contract and Tort As a Case Study With
Special Reference to Product-Related Economic Loss, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989).
5. For a more general exposition of the themes in this paragraph, see Saul Bell<;>w,
Foreword to A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION
HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS at 11
(1987).
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modern society as well as unclear about their own roles and those of
law schools vis-a-vis the rest of the university, the profession and
society.
Law schools may be experiencing a period of intellectual confusion similar to that which confronted the French Academy painters
more than a century ago. 6 Those traditional artists, threatened with
the prospect of losing their hegemony, rejected the work of Manet
and the Impressionists, painters who eventually transformed the
very definition of art. Some law schools have treated similarly efforts of women working principally in the fields of legal theory and
feminist jurisprudence to be accepted as full-fledged members of
their academic communities.
These institutions have rejected (discouraged or granted with
great reluctance) tenure and teaching applications of women who
have produced outstanding theoretical and practical work. 7 For instance, burgeoning feminist scholarship and some of the candidates'
endeavors in particular have contributed significantly to the amelioration of two ubiquitous societal practices that degrade women the
most: wife battering and sexual harassment, especially in the workplace. 8 The rejection of these applicants has had harmful ramifications beyond the obvious detrimental impacts on the individuals.
Students have been deprived of professors who challenge them,
who are experts in substantive fields important to the students, and
who are valuable mentors. Specific faculties and the law teaching
profession have lost the intellectual stimulation, the collegiality, and
the diverse viewpoints the candidates would have offered. The adverse employment decisions also have significant implications for
the particular institutions, making them more limited, less dynamic
and even anti-intellectual. One recent hiring dispute was characterized as a battle for the school's soul in which those who narrowly
succeeded in securing appointment of a prominent feminist scholar
were said to doubt the value of their victory because the fight had
been so divisive. 9
6. This is a necessarily truncated account. For thorough treatment, see J. CANADAY,
MAINSTREAMS OF MODERN ART chs. 14-15 (2d ed. 1981).
7. "Rejection" will be used as shorthand for the two possibilities mentioned in the
parenthetical. Twenty percent of American law schools are making less progress than
others and prestigious schools comprise a significant number of these institutions.
Chused, supra note I, at 539, 548.
8. The classic example is c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX D1scRJMINATJON (1979). For more general discussion of these
efforts and the amelioration effected, see Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives From the Womens Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 642-48 (1986).
9. Adams, A Baille for Yale Law School's Soul, Nat'I LJ., Feb. 15, 1988, at 3, col. I.
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The ways these tenure and appointment determinations appear to
have been made are particularly troubling in that the women rejected seemed to meet the requirements as clearly as men. An important complication is that some decisions apparently have been
premised on the political perspectives of the applicants. One woman's tenure request was refused even though "all parties seem to
agree [she had] impeccable credentials," having published a pathbreaking article in a law review widely acknowledged to be the nation's second best and having had a book scheduled for publication
by Oxford University Press, perhaps the most prestigious such publisher; she claimed that "they don't want women who threaten the
status quo too much." 10
Application of the criteria employed in reaching the determinations also appears especially problematic. Significant difficulties are
that the criteria themselves are facially so demanding or can be applied so rigidly that they are virtually impossible to meet (of course,
few of the already tenured faculty applying the standards could satisfy them).
An individual recently denied tenure received glowing praise
from many national and international luminaries in her field, including Jacques Derrida, a preeminent French philosopher. Although
the applicant was only an assistant professor, she was said to have
written more than any member of the faculty at the same career
stage, publishing some fifteen pieces in numerous respected
journals. 11
Correspondingly, the criteria can be applied in ways that seem
technical. For example, although elite and aspiring law schools have
accorded less value to scholarship that is doctrinal or practical while
theoretical work has enjoyed a special cachet, the theory which is
prized has had to fit within a narrow band on the theoretical spectrum. Thus, several women whose candidacies were in dispute discovered or developed new substantive areas, created or
reformulated the terms of legal discourse, or imaginatively explored
or articulated novel ways of understanding law or of resolving legal
controversies. 12 Nevertheless, their contributions proved too much
and too little; they were deemed both overly theoretical and unconI 0. Down a11d Out i11 Cambridge, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1988, at 66. The law review article
was Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstrnction of Co11trac/ Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
11. Moss, supra note I, at 50. She is negotiating conditions for reconsideration of
the tenure denial and another school "overwhelmingly voted" to offer her tenure.
Markoff, Tenure Offered, Nat'I L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 4, col. 3.
12. Professor MacKinnon's seminal work on sexual harassment is a helpful example.
c. MACKINNON, supra note 8.
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ventional. Indeed, considerable debate involving these individuals'
candidacies apparently centered on whether the substance of their
work was legitimate, whether the analytical techniques they used
were appropriate in the legal academy, whether their endeavors
constituted law, and the meaning of law and legal scholarship.
Many of these problems are epitomized by the observations of
two male faculty members in a recent hiring dispute and by the advice deans of two elite schools gave women faculty. The first professor allegedly asserted that appointment of someone " 'whose forte
is extremist, mystical polemics and who rejects both legal method
and scholarship as 'male dominated,' hence invalid, would be a betrayal of our essence' - which he defined as 'responsible scholarship.' " 13 The other reportedly stated that, were the applicant
hired, the school "could rapidly become a theater of ideological
warfare, as well as an insufficiently supervised playground of the
mind in which we lose our capacity to resist the charms of superficial
and passing intellectual fads." 14 The deans were said to have advised female faculty that work in the areas of feminist legal theory or
gender discrimination simply was not worthwhile. 15
Of course, these techniques of rejection are venerable, enjoying
pedigrees that substantially predate the Academy painters. For instance, by delineating as appropriate particular areas for substantive
inquiry and as proper methodologies for addressing them and by
prescribing as acceptable certain modes of discourse, it is possible at
once to disparage specific fields of endeavor and analytical techniques and to discredit those who work in the areas. 16
Allegations of some that the rejection of these women reflects sexism cannot be proved. It is difficult to imagine, however, that very
many legal academicians would seriously contend that the seminal
substantive work and novel approaches to law of James Boyd White
or Milner Ball are ill-suited to law schools or that they should depart
13. Adams, supra note 9, at 8, cols. 3-4.
14. Id. at 8, col. 3.
15. See Moss, supra note 1, at 52; Adams, supra note 9, at 8, col. 2. One of the deans
stated that he could not "conceive of saying anything of the sort." Adams, supra note 9,
at 8, col. 2. There are indications that some untenured women faculty are being advised
not to produce scholarship in areas such as feminist legal thought, lest their tenure
opportunities be threatened. Wald, Women in the Law, 24 TRIAL 75, 77 (November
1988); Carter, Women Face Hurdles as Professors, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 24, 1988, at l, col. l, 31,
col. 2.
16. Ridicule is another classic technique. In the hiring dispute mentioned above,
one of the male professors opposed to appointment allegedly circulated a memorandum
entitled "Feminism Unhinged," an obvious attempt to denigrate both Professor
MacKinnon and her recent, well-received book entitled FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). See Adams, supra note 9, at 8, col. 3.
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the academy (treatment suggested as appropriate for Critical Legal
scholars by a former dean of one elite school) . 17 Nevertheless, the
contributions of Professors White and Ball are no more demonstrably "legal" or concrete than the work of the women at the center of
these disputes. Moreover, most of the women appear to have met
the relevant criteria as clearly as numerous men whose applications
were contemporaneously granted without controversy. 18 Given the
pervasive, complex and subtle nature of sexism in American society
and the very recent entry of women in substantial numbers to law
schools and the profession, it would be surprising if sexism were
absent from law schools and from these tenure and appointment
decisions. 19
In light of the current intellectual state of the law and the present
circumstances of legal academia-marked by uncertainty, indeterminacy, and ferment-greater, rather than less, respect for diversity is
warranted. What has happened in law schools, however, constitutes
movement in the wrong direction. Preferable approaches are to be
as inclusive as possible and receptive to the widest practicable substantive inquiry. For example, law schools should foster in their
communities enhanced appreciation and expanded application of
knowledge developed in non-legal disciplines or derived from systems of law other than Anglo-American ones while increasing the
17. A recent example of Professor White's work is HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW ( 1985). A recent example of Professor Ball's work is
LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAw, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985). For the suggestion as
to Critical Legal scholars, see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222,
226-27 (1984).
18. For example, the woman, mentioned supra text accompanying note 10, claimed
"her record was equal to or better than that of seven men voted tenure during the 19861987 school year." Moss, supra note I, at 50. Two tenured faculty members stated that
the woman, mentioned supra text accompanying note 11, may have been denied tenure
based in part on gender discrimination. Moss, supra note I, at 50. Moreover, this thesis
is implicit throughout Professor Angel's study of tenure decisions involving women at
five law schools. Angel, supra note 2. Indeed, Drucilla Ramey, executive director and
general counsel of the Bar Association of Sar. Francisco, testified before the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession that tenure of women faculty is a "national
disgrace." "Ms. Ramey testified that 'it is an absolute open secret among every single
woman who teaches ... in law school today that, in fact, the ordinary schlemiel from
these elite law schools who got some clerkship is going to get tenure without too much
trouble in our most distinguished schools, whereas women are scrutinized under a
microscope and are generally found to be fatally flawed in one way or another." Carter,
supra note 15, at 31.
19. For data on women's entry into law schools and on tenure decisions involving
women, see Angel, supra note 2. Cf Chused, supra note I, at 548-52 (more data on
tenure decisions). For a recent study of gender differences in the law school and
professional experiences of students and graduates of one law school, see Gender, Legal
Education, and the legal Profession: 1ln Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (1988).
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number of faculty who work in non-traditional fields, such as feminist legal thought.
I am not contending that henceforth all scholarship be replete
with references to Continental philosophers or that social scientists
be de rigueur on every law school faculty. I am not advocating diversity for diversity's sake or suggesting that standards be jettisoned in
pursuit of diversity. 20 I also am not predicting that those working in
the area of feminist legal thought will be the next Impressionists or
even the new Legal Realists. Nevertheless, they have offered strikingly new insights to date and promise to make even greater contributions in the future, especially in fields of compelling importance
to women and society. 21
I am arguing that women should not be held to more demanding
requirements than men. I urge as well the development and application of criteria which admit of varied theoretical and political perspectives and analytical techniques, although I appreciate that
crafting and employing such standards may be· difficult. For example, when judging contributions in areas as complex and controversial as gender issues, the criteria should be whether the work
stimulates constructive thinking or fosters new ways of analyzing the
issues rather than whether it resolves the questions, galvanizes consensus, or ultimately persuades the reader. 22 Correspondingly,
writing in the area of feminist legal theory would be equally valuable
as that in tax or constitutional law, while drafting an ordinance that
seeks to limit pornography because it discriminates against women
would constitute public service as important as writing a Securities
20. I realize that respect for diversity can cover a multitude of sins and that beyond a
certain-or more likely, uncertain-point, diversity alone will not be enough.
21. See, e.g., Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. I, 15 (1987) (women's
movement seems to be on the verge of mobilizing an entire generation of law students).
For an example of their efforts which have helped to ameliorate wife battering and
sexual harassment, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. Much work remains to be
done in those areas and numerous others-such as sexism, gender discrimination in
employment, pregnancy policies, and child care-before women will be full participants
in law schools, the legal profession, and society. For valuable recent work on these
issues, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 16; Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); West, jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. I (1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797
(1989).
22. The standards listed at the end of the sentence in the text simply are unrealistic
and too demanding in areas as unsettled and potentially explosive as gender issues
involving delicate, threatening questions of male/female personal and political power.
For discussion of such power, see C. MACKINNON, supra note 8; Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 ( 1983). For analysis of
new understandings of gender relations in professional settings, see Rhode, Perspectives
011 Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. l 163 (1988).
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and Exchange Commission regulation or revising a state probate
code. 23 There is ample room in law school communities for traditional legal scholarship, Critical Legal Studies, law and economics,
and feminist legal thought as well as much more.
This is a call for recognition that pluralism and diversity are
healthy and a plea for the broadest feasible endeavor consistent with
the multi-faceted missions of law schools. 24 Restrictions may be imposed by resource constraints or by felt obligations of law schools to
their varied constituencies. Most potential difficulties likely to be
encountered have not been considered, much less tested, and it now
appears that few will prove intractable. 25 The approaches suggested
promise to increase the number of members of the academic community who are included in the intellectual enterprise and to enable
women to become full participants in legal education. They also
should make law schools more stimulating and humane institutions
while enriching the continuing quest for a clearer under~~anding of
law as we enter the last decade of the twentieth century. 26
23. The suggestions in the text are intended to be just that, suggestive. Others can
be offered and should be developed and applied. For instance, faculty who find that the
Socratic method impedes learning and who experiment with alternative teaching
techniques should not be penalized (and probably should be rewarded) for those
choices when their teaching is evaluated for tenure purposes. For criticism of the
Socratic method and discussion of alternatives, see Moss, supra note 1, at 54-55. For
additional helpful suggestions, see Angel, supra note 2, at 832-36.
24. At the January 1989 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS), 300 law faculty called for the appointment of an independent commission to
study diversity in law school faculties. Petition to the AALS House of Representatives
(Dec. 21, 1988) (on file with University of Cincinnati Law Review). Cf Wald, supra note
15, at 77 ( "Law schools have much introspection and outreaching to do-quickly" if the
legal "profession is serious about bringing women into the mainstream with full rights
and benefits.").
25. Indeed, the University of Wisconsin Law School simultaneously extended offers
to four minority law professors last year. Markoff, Wisconsin Does the Impossible; Boosts
JHinority Ranks by Four, Nat'l LJ., March 6, 1989, at 4, col. I. Cf letter from Professor
Richard Wydick, Chair, Faculty Appointments Committee, University of California
Davis, School of Law, to Carl Tobias (March 27, 1989) (consistent with school's desire to
diversify the law faculty, University of California Davis recently extended offers to three
people, one of whom was black and two of whom were Mexican-American).
26. In April, 1989, Professor Herma Hill Kay, President of AALS, strongly called for
law schools to promote diversity. She recommended that the AALS "generate its own
data on faculty recruitment and retention practices" and that there be "a true
acceptance of the differences in background, experience, talent, and intellectual taste
that are represented by the concept of 'diversity' [that] will enable all of us to hear and
value the many voices of modern legal education." She added that the "reward for all of
us, if we are successful, will lie in the intellectual richness that diversity confers upon our
joint enterprise." AALS Newsletter No. 89-2, 1-3 (April 1989). For recent work
exploring conditions that would be hospitable to diversity in legal scholarship, see
Dalton, The Faithful Liberal and the Question of Diversity, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1989).

